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Introduction 
I am asked to discuss policy objectives, so let me first both limit and clarify my 
credentials to do so. I do not represent Lhe Minister of Labour or his policy advisors, nor 
are any views I express necessarily those of my employer, the Department of Labour. So 
I do not write with lhe authority of a policy maker. 
Rather I write as a lawyer who provided some advice to the policy mak~ers during the 
exercise that led to the passage of the Labour R~elations Act in 1987. In broad tenus I was 
advising them on how to achieve their stated policy objectives. In practice this can require 
some involv~ement in the policy-making pfocess itself, because often broad policy 
objectives can only be achieved after second-tier or lower level policy issues have been 
identified and worked through. So, ~coming from 'that background of involv~ement in that 
process I can perhaps offer you some infonned comments on the provisions concerned, but 
not necessarily authoritative ones. 
I note that the title of this se.minar, "Strikes and the Labour ~Court", would seem to limit 
my discussion to the intended impact of the injunction and compliance order provisions on 
industrial action. The complianoe order jurisdiction does however cover a far broader area 
than strikes (or lockouts}. To fully address and appreciate the objectives behind that 
jurisdiction it would be necessary to go beyond the narrow but topical issue of strike 
action and mention the wider concept of co,mpliance with tJ1e .Act, and awards and 
agreements, generally. 
More importantly, I ·would suggest that the aim of the compliance and injunction 
provisions cannot be properly ascertained simply by looking at them in isolation. Their 
role in the total scheme of the Act, in particular their r~elationship to dispute-solving 
mechanisms and sanctity of agreement, must be assessed, as must the direct impact on 
them of the Labour Court's changed jurisdiction and structure. But before adopting my 
own suggestion and looking at these provisions in the wider context, I think it may be 
helpful to give a preliminary brief explanation of lhe injunction and compliance order 
• • • proviSions 1n a narrow sense . 
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The narrow perspective 
Injunctions: 
When I talk about Lhe "injunction provisions" of the Act I am referring not only to 
section 243, which expressly deals with injunctions, but also to section 242, dealing with 
the tortious jurisdiction. Clearly, one remedy sought in the course of such tortious 
actions may well be an injunction. 
Sections 242 and 243 represent Parliament's attempt at transferring a specific and limited 
area of the High Court's jurisdiction into the new Labour Court's jurisdiction. It was a 
simple change of venue, with virtually no attempt to change the rules by which the game 
was to be played (see s.279 (4) and s.303 (1), but note s.242 (3) and s.243 (3)). The 
intention was for l.he specialist labour relations Court to bring its expertise to bear also on 
these particular labour relations matters, but applying the same law that had always been 
applied. That approach accords with the strong sentiments expressed by the Court of 
Appeal in 1985 in the Irvines Bakery 1 case to the effect that it was desirable that 
industrial issues be dealt with in the first instance by the Arbitration Court. Parliament 
would seem in this regard anyway Lo have converted that desirability into an imperative. 
Compliance orders 
As pointed out in the Irvines Bakery case, the old Arbitration Coun had within its 
armoury the power to issue compliance with any award, order or collective agreement (s. 
48 (2) (d) of the Industrial Relations Act 1973). The effectiveness of that power was 
questionable, however, given that recourse had later to be had to the ordinary ~courts to 
ensure compliance with the so-called compliance order. ·The Arbitration Court seldom., if 
ever, used the power. Section 207 of the Labour Relations Act gives a new life and 
emphasis to this power. It ~extends the power to breaches of the Act itself and to breaches 
of orders of bodies constituted under the Act. It gives the District Court a similar power 
in matters under the Labour R~elations Act. It makes it clear that a compliance order may 
be the sole remedy sought in any case or it may be an ancillary remedy. Finally, it giv~es 
the Court itself effective powers to ensure that the compliance order is complied with. 
The objectives of this rejuvenated compliance order procedure were twofold. Firstly, to 
give the Labour Court itself a simple yet effective way of finalising matters. Secondly, to 
give applicants to Lhe Court a straightforward means of obtaining effective remedies for 
breaches which affect them. 
The Act as a whole 
A~ I have said, the compliance order and injunction provisions need to be viewed in the 
wider context of the new systen1 established under the Labour R~elations Act if we are to 
appreciate what Government hoped to achieve from them. The long title to the Act 
professes it to be an Act "to provide procedures for the orderly conduct of relations 
between workers and employers". One of the main thrusls of the Act is in fact to make it 
clear that in an industrial sense it is up to the parlies to det~ermine .their own destinies. 
1 
New aaland Baking T~ades Employees JUW v General Foods Corporation (NZ) l.Jd. 
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The Government's White Paper of September 1986 saw collective employment documents 
being in future "freely negotiated., administered, and enforced by the parties." 
This self-enfofcement aspect of the Act had been discretely foreshadowed by the practice of 
the Minister of Labour since he took office in 1984. In mark~ed contrast ~o his 
predecessors he had remained aloof from induslrial disputes, ~earning rebukes and a 
nickname for doing so, but certainly establishing new precedents in New Zealand's 
industrial relations scene. The consistency of the stance seemed to heighten the accuracy, 
yet dismiss the implicit criticism of the nickname . The 1987 Act provided an ·even better 
scenario for such a stance to thrive in. Statutory penalties were removed from the 
legislation. The role of the Departm~ent of Labour was significantly r~educed. The 
industrial parties or players were given cl~ear rules as ~o what was and was not possible, 
and clearly applicable mechanisms for resolving disputes were put in place, with suitable 
institutions to back them up. 
The most significant of those institutions is of course the one of last resort, the Labour 
Court. Under the 1973 Industrial Relations Act, it had been clearly acknowledged by the 
ordinary courts that the Arbitration Court had a special interest and expertise in industrial 
issues ... an interest and expertise that ought not to be preempted if it could be avoided. 
Yet it was undeniable that there was overlapping jurisdiction in some areas, so that a 
choice of the type of action to be ·tak·en determined which court the matter was to be 
argued in. This had sev~eral undesirable ~eatures, not the least of which was that at the end 
of the day., having utilised extensive resources to argue a case in the ordinary courts, the 
parties might fmd the·mselves referred back to the specialist court The 1987 Act aims to 
concentrate disputes in the Labour Court ... henc~e the transfer of the tort and injunction 
jurisdictions, and importantly the transfer of the relevant aspects of the High Court's 
judicial review jurisdiction (s. 280). 
The Court itself is not only given additional judicial jurisdiction. It is stripped of the 
previous arbitral and registration functions so that it truly becon1es a Court, concerned 
only with judicial matters. It is streamlined so that it becomes largely a judge-only 
Court, with only limited ins'tances where lay personnel need sit on it. It is, independently 
of the statute, decentralised, so that it will have permanent courts based in Auckland and 
Christchurch as well as Wellington. In addition it is given by section 307 th~e power to 
make rules regulating its practice and procedure, which, significantly in the injunction 
area, gives it scope for reducing the procedural constraints that were inherent in the High 
Court jurisdiction. Urgency is also expressly provided for (s. 296). All of this adds up to 
a clear statement of support ~or a court which is to be a specialist in its area, which is to 
be able t.o both grant hearings and give decisions quickly when necessary, and which has 
the procedural ability to get straight to the heart of matters. In this institutional context 
the injunction and compliance order provisions become practical and sensible propositions 
in the appropriate circumstances. 
Sanctity of agreement is the next issue of relevance. When moving the Second Reading 
of the Labour Relations Bill in the House last year, the Ministc1 of Labour predicted that 
the provisions of Part VII "coupled wiLh the powers of the Labour Court to order 
compliance, wiH greatly strengthen sanctity of agreement". Part VII of the Act enacts a 
bargaining system that emphasises a single enforceable end-product. Each worker is 
covered by one ~enforceable award or agreement that, subject to the new matters and 
redundancy provisions, cannot be altered during its currency. The award exemption 
process (s. 152) and the limited availability of the registration process provide 
disincentives to attempts at overriding such awards or agreements. Add to this an arguably 
clear~er distinction between disputes of interest and disputes of rights, and appropriate 
mechanisms for resolving such disputes, and you have in New Zealand terms an 
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unprecedented emphasis on sanctity of industrial accords. The co~p_liance order pro~isio~s 
(and to a lesser extent the injunction provisions) are merely the tctng on the cake In th1s 
respect 
Accepting that sanctity is an ideal, industrial disputes and industrial action afe real~ ties th~t 
have to be legislated for rather than legislated against .. The ~ovemment ~ecogn1sed th1s 
by putting in place a system that firstly provides approprta~e dtspute-resoluu_on. procedures 
(e.g. conciliation, dispute committees, grievance committees, the CommiSSion and the 
Court), that secondly exerts subtle p~essures on the parties to play by the rules (e.g. 
s.152, s. 189, s. 218), and that finally accepts the inevitability of industrial action but 
which classifies it as lawful or unlawful depending upon whether or not there exist other 
means of resolving it which should have been followed. Such classification only really 
becomes significant in the context of tortious or injunction proceedings. Where industrial 
action can be classified as lawful then sections 233 (2), 242(3) and 243 (3) make it clear 
that the Labour Court has to dismiss any tortious or injunction action if it resulted from 
that lawful strike or lockout. If my understanding of the common law is correct this has 
an impact only on conspiracy actions, where lawful actions may still have been actionable 
if the predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff. 
One of Government's stated objectives was to establish a clearer definition of the 
circumstances in which strikes and lockouts are lawful or unlawful (Whi~e Paper, 1986). 
This is a different proposi Lion from attempting to establish whether or not strikes and 
lockouts are actionable or not. Although declaring a certain type of strike or lockout to 
be lawful may p!ieclude successful tortious or injunction proceedings in ~espect of it, there 
may well be situations where compliance order proceedings are possible, even though the 
strike or lockout in question is, in teuns of the Act, prima facie lawful. An example 
might be where the applicable award contained a clause by which the workers agreed not to 
strike in respect of a dispute of interest during the currency of the award,. In such a case a 
strike relating to a dispute of interest one week before the expiry of the award is, in terms 
of s.233 of the Act, lawful. But it would also constitute an apparent breach of the current 
award and as such give rise to the possibility of an action for a compliance order.. 
You will note lhatlhe Government's stated intention was not to try to classify every type 
of strike or lockout as lawful or unlawful. Sections 233 and 234 clearly do not describe 
every situation in which a strike or lockout may occur. It is easy to think of other 
situations which are not covered- sympalhy strikes or political strikes for example- and 
the IJabour Coun has already had at least one case before it where the strike was held not 
to be of a type described in either section 233 or section 234 (flancock's case2 whefe 
Chief Judge Hom found that the strike concerned an overall ongoing disruptive situation 
in lhe workplace and the basis for it was far wider than a particular personal grievance). 
Still addressing the wider context into which the compliance order and injunction 
provisions fit, I return to some matters I have mentioned in passing already. The first is 
the removal of statutory penalties from lhe legislation in respect of strikes and lockouts. J 
Such p~nalti~s had proved lhemselves to be singularly inapt and ineffective for preventing 
or solving dtsputes. The State, lhrough the Departrnent of Labour, became the meat in 
the indu.slrial sandwich. It was no-win country -pressure to take action, pressure not to 
take actiOn, pres~sure to stop taking action, lhe last often exerted by an unholy alliance 
between lhe parues after they had resolved their differences. The new labour relations 
2 
Hancock and Company v Wellington District 1/ot,el, Hospital, Restauranz, ,etc JUW and 
others. 
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system looks to the parties to resolve their differences using certain defined procedur~es, 
which they themselves must initiate. It recognises that this will not always work, so, as 
the White Paper says, it strengthens their ability to protect 'their own rights. This 
strengthening is most evident in the revamped compliance order procedure, but is assisted 
by the enhancement of the status of the Labour Court and the transfer to it of certain 
~ormer High Court jurisdictions. 
Another matter already touched upon is the reduction of the role of the Department of 
Labour. Departmental Inspectors previously had a significant role ~collecting wage arrears 
and taking actions for breach of award. This was in addition to their role of taking either 
penalty or prosecution action for breach of the legislation. The tendency was therefore for 
the parties to be at arm's length, with contact often effectively through the Department, 
not as intennediary but as enforcer ~or one side or the other. Putting aside the question of 
the appropriateness of that role, one thing was clear - ~enforcement by fine or penalty was 
more, often than not, only a nuisance, with continued non-compliance often following the 
payment of the fme or penalty. Clearly if there were to be binding agreements between 
parties the objective had to be to ensure that commitments under those agreements were 
met. It benefited the one party liLLie to see lhe other party punished monetarily for 
ignoring commitments if that other party continued blithely to ignore them even after 
punishment. What was needed was an effective and useful remedy. 
What seemed most useful was compelling the other party to comply with their ~existing 
legal obligations. Hence the en1phasis on expanding the ~compliance order jurisdiction. It 
is aldn to t.he contractual remedy of specific performance., but without the restrictive 
overlay of rules that limit the availability of that remedy . It recognises that the aggrieved 
party is not necessarily interested in seeing the other party penalised but rather in seeing 
them do what they are supposed to be doing anyway. If damages or a monetary penalty 
are also seen as appropriate then tortious remedies or a penalty action are available also. 
But it is a .matter for the aggrieved party to determine in all the circumstances. More often 
that not, having the other party punished in some way will sour rather than improve the 
relationship between the parties. 
It is to be noted that the compliance order jurisdiction is a discretionary one (recognised by 
Chief Judge Hom in the Hancock's case). It is also tempered by the Court's special equity 
and good conscience jurisdiction. This is an implicit indication that compliance orders 
were not seen to be available as a matter of right simply on proof of breach. There may 
be other relevant factors, importantly, the availability or otherwise of other appropriate 
procedures to resolve the dispute. It would seem unlikely for example that the compliance 
order jurisdiction could be used to circumvent the disputes committee or grievance 
com.mittee process, but it may of course be used to ~einforce both the use of such a 
process and its result. 
It may also be used to prevent a disputes procedure being invoked inappropriately. In the 
Fortex 3 case, Judge Palmer had to consider whether the subject matter of the proposed 
compliance order was properly within the definition of a dispute of rights. In granting the 
complianc~e order sought, he made an interesting statement at page 15 which I think is 
important to the relationship between the compliance order jurisdiction and other dispute-
resolution procedures under the Act. He said this: 
3 New Zealand Meal Processors, Packers, P~eservers, Freezing Works and RelaJed 
Trades /UW v Fortex Group LJd 
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A dispute of rights cannot be created ... because one party to an agreement elects to 
misconstrue its application, purpose and scope ... I am not prepared to ·elevate the 
company's plain misconstruction to a dispute of rights. 
Judge Palmer's decision in that case, in my view serves t? confirm that the n~w system 
provides clearly applicable mechanisms for resolving certa!n defin~d types of ~spu~e and 
that where those m~echanisms do not apply and a breach IS established the discretion to 
issue a compliance order will be exercised positively. 
Effective remedies 
I have suggested that one intention of the new system was to provide effective r~emedies. 
How was this intention evidenced in the Labour Relations Act? As far as injunctions 
were concerned there seemed no doubt that the remedy, to the extent that it had been 
sought in the past, was an effective one. Hence the straight transfer of the tortious and 
injunction jurisdictions fro:m the High Court without any real substantive change . 
Similarly there was no tinkering with the interim order jurisdiction linked ~o the transfer 
of judicial review frorn the High Coun. 
The compliance order jurisdiction was another matter. Obviously the provision in the 
1973 Act was less than adequate. The starting point was the scope of the jwisdiction. To 
provide the parties with an effective remedy, but only in certain areas of their activities, 
would have been only doing half the job. Accordingly the availability of the compliance 
order had to be universal in matters involving the Labour Relations Act Hence the detail 
of section 207 (1) (a) and (b) and also the ability of the District Court to utilize the 
jurisdiction. 
The type of proceedings required were another question. ~o place as few procedural 
restrictions as possible in the way of applicants was the aim. H'ence, we have section 207 
(2) and (3) which provide that the compliance order may be sought as the sole remedy, as 
an ancillary or substituted remedy, or may be imposed by the Court even where not 
sought. Flexibility was provided by subsections (4), (5) and (6) to the extent that orders 
can be conditional and can be of an interim nature to allow the party in breach to avoid 
some additionaJ order of the Coun. Most importantly, section 207 (7) gives lhe Court 
itself significant powers where a compliance order i.s not adhered to. It is no longer 
necessary to seek further enforcement via the inherent contempt jurisdiction of the High 
Court. 
Summary 
I have suggested that the proper perspective of the injunction and compliance order 
provisions is provided by looking at them in terms of their contribution to an entire and 
new labour relations system. The need for more effective and available en£orcement 
mechanisms is heightened by the removal to a large ex tent of the state from the arena. 
The parties, when left to their own devices, must be able to police their own agreements 
effectively. If sanctity of agreement is to be an achie,,able ideal then, once all the 
inducements have been ignored, there :must be an effective enforcem~ent backup. Where 
enforcem·ent has to occur through a judicial process, the Court involved must have 
sufficient standing and expertise and possess effective pow~ers. Effectiveness in the labour 
relations arena is not necessarily provided by punishment. The ideal is that obligations be 
met. 
• 
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Whether these sort of ideals and objectives have been met is something that time will tell. 
John Hughes and Gordon Anderson provide an analysis of the Labour Court's decisions in 
the area to date (Hughes and Anderson, 1988). Perhaps that analysis will enable you to 
judge for yourselves. The only assessment I can offer you is a very superficial and general 
one and it is this: That the Court itself seems, with respect, to have quickly come to 
terms with these new roles and to be giving decisions that are in the main consistent and 
that accord with the objects and provisions of the Act. That the parties, on the other hand, 
have been quick to use the new jurisdictions but slow to appreciate when it is appropriate 
to use them. I think that with time the whole system will be better understood by the 
participants and from that will follow a decreasing readiness and need to reach for a 
Statement of Claim .. 
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